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ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM AND THE
PHILOSOPHY OF FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT
Robert W. McGee
ABSTRACT
Frédéric Bastiat (1801-1850) was a French economist and journalist.
One of his classic works, The Candlemakers’ Petition, uses the reductio ad
absurdum philosophical technique to dismantle the arguments the French
protectionists put forth to protect French industry in the mid-nineteenth
century. His Petition has been reprinted in numerous college economics
texts and it has been cited in the scholarly economics literature.
But Bastiat’s writings on protectionism include much more than his
Candlemakers’ Petition. This paper discusses The Candlemakers’ Petition
as a starting point, then explores his other, lesser known writings on
protectionism and applies his theories to current conditions.
INTRODUCTION
Frédéric Bastiat (1801–1850) was a French journalist, economist, and
pamphleteer. Several authors have written biographies about his life and
work.1 Mülberger devoted a full volume to his debate with Proudhon about
the justification for interest.2
Although not as frequently cited in the economics literature as some
other economists of the period, his writings have lived on and have stood
the test of time.3
Bastiat has penned several works that have been labeled as classics. His
essay, What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen, proposes a methodology
economists, political philosophers, and policy makers should use to



Florida International University.

1. ADOLPHE IMBERT, FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT

ET LE SOCIALISME DE SON TEMPS (1913);
GEORGES DE NOUVION, FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT: SA VIE—SES ŒUVRES—SES DOCTRINES (1905);
GEORGE C. ROCHE, III, FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT: A MAN ALONE (1971); P. RONCE, FRÉDÉRIC
BASTIAT: SA VIE, SON ŒUVRE (1905); DEAN RUSSELL, FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT: IDEAS AND
INFLUENCE (1969).
2. ARTHUR MÜLBERGER, KAPITAL UND ZINS: DIE POLEMIK ZWISCHEN BASTIAT UND
PROUDHON (1896).
3. See FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT, THE BASTIAT COLLECTION (2007) [hereinafter THE BASTIAT
COLLECTION]; FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT, ECONOMIC HARMONIES (W. Hayden Boyers trans., George B.
de Huszar ed., 4th prtg. 1996) [hereinafter BASTIAT, ECONOMIC HARMONIES]; FRÉDÉRIC
BASTIAT, ECONOMIC SOPHISMS (Arthur Goddard ed. & trans., 5th prtg. 1996) [hereinafter
BASTIAT, ECONOMIC SOPHISMS]; Frédéric Bastiat, La Loi [The Law] (first published as a
pamphlet in 1850), reprinted in ŒUVRES COMPLÈTES DE FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT, TOME QUATRIÈME
342–93 (3d ed. 1873), reprinted in English in THE BASTIAT COLLECTION, supra, VOL. 1, at 49–94
(2007) and FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT, THE LAW (Dean Russell trans., 2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter
BASTIAT, THE LAW]; FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT, SELECTED ESSAYS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY (Seymour
Cain trans., George B. de Huszar ed., 4th prtg. 1995) [hereinafter BASTIAT, SELECTED ESSAYS].
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examine economic, political, and policy issues.4 In it, he shows that it is
necessary to examine the effects a policy has on all groups, in both the
long-run and the short-run. Hazlitt states that the failure to examine the
effect a policy has on all groups is the main reason so many economic
theories are faulty.5 At a recent conference on international business and
public administration, I applied the Bastiat approach to show why much of
the international relations literature inadequately explains the failure of
most economic sanctions.6
Another classic, The Law, discusses and illustrates the difference
between good law and bad law.7 It addresses the interplay between major
legal and moral concepts, such as when the laws are used to obtain what
one could not obtain privately without committing a crime (modern
economists refer to this as “rent-seeking”8) or when it is used to redistribute
wealth. It also points out that the reason we have laws is because of
property, not the other way around.9 His third classic, The Candlemakers’
Petition,10 is discussed below.
Bastiat was an active participant in the free trade debate of the 1840s.11
He was a friend of Richard Cobden and John Bright—the founders of the
4. Frédéric Bastiat, Ce Qu’on Voit et Ce Qu’on ne Voit Pas [What Is Seen and What Is Not
Seen] (first published as a pamphlet in 1850), reprinted in ŒUVRES COMPLÈTES DE FRÉDÉRIC
BASTIAT, TOME CINQUIÈME, at 336–92 (1873); reprinted in English in BASTIAT, SELECTED
ESSAYS, supra note 3, at 1–50, and THE BASTIAT COLLECTION, supra note 3, VOL. I, at 1–48
[hereinafter Bastiat, What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen in BASTIAT, SELECTED ESSAYS].
5. HENRY HAZLITT, ECONOMICS IN ONE LESSON (1952).
6. Robert W. McGee, Ethical Aspects of Economic Sanctions: A Third Theory (Apr. 23–26,
2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial and
Commercial Law).
7. BASTIAT, THE LAW, supra note 3.
8. Gordon Tullock identified the concept of rent seeking in a 1967 article. See Gordon
Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967). See also
Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291
(1974). A ProQuest search failed to find a single mention of the term prior to Krueger’s article.
Bastiat discussed the concept of rent seeking in THE LAW in 1850, thus anticipating Tullock by
more than 100 years. See BASTIAT, THE LAW 7–9.
9. BASTIAT, THE LAW, supra note 3.
10. Frédéric Bastiat, Pétition des Fabricants de Chandelles, Bougies, Lampes, Chandeliers,
Réverbères, Mouchettes, Éteignoirs, et des Producteurs de Suif, Huile, Résine, Alcool, et
Généralement de Tout Ce Qui Concerne L’Éclairage, reprinted in ŒUVRES COMPLÈTES DE
FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT, TOME QUATRIÈME, at 57–62 (3d ed. 1873), available at
http://files.libertyfund.org/files/946/0137-04_Bk_Sm.pdf, reprinted in English in THE BASTIAT
COLLECTION, supra note 4, VOL. I, at 227–32 and BASTIAT, ECONOMIC SOPHISMS, supra note 3,
at 56–60 [hereinafter Bastiat, Petition in BASTIAT, ECONOMIC SOPHISMS].
11. Frédéric Bastiat, Cobden et la Ligue, reprinted in ŒUVRES COMPLÈTES DE FRÉDÉRIC
BASTIAT, TOME TROISIÈME (3d ed. 1864), available at http://files.libertyfund.org/files/945/013703_Bk_Sm.pdf [hereinafter Bastiat, Cobden et la Ligue]; Frédéric Bastiat, Correspondance
Mélanges, reprinted in ŒUVRES COMPLÈTES DE FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT, TOME PREMIER (2d ed.
1862), available at http://files.libertyfund.org/files/943/0137-01_Bk.pdf; BASTIAT, ECONOMIC
HARMONIES, supra note 3; BASTIAT, ECONOMIC SOPHISMS, supra note 3; Frédéric Bastiat,
Essais—Ébauches—Correspondance, reprinted in ŒUVRES COMPLÈTES DE FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT,
TOME SEPTIÈME (1861), available at http://files.libertyfund.org/files/949/0137-07_Bk_Sm.pdf;
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British Corn Law League—and engaged in detailed correspondence with
them.12
His contributions to the economics literature have been sufficient for
him to earn a place in Mark Blaug’s Great Economists before Keynes.13
Robert Heilbroner devotes a major portion of a chapter to Bastiat in his
classic book The Worldly Philosophers, first published in 1953 and used in
economics classrooms ever since.14 Rothbard devotes nine pages to Bastiat
in volume two of his history of economic thought15 and credits Bastiat with
refuting the Keynesian multiplier theory nearly 100 years before it was
advanced by Keynes.16 Skousen spends seven pages discussing Bastiat in
his history of economic thought.17 Schumpeter referred to him as a “brilliant
economic journalist.”18 Haney devotes chapter 15 of his History of
Economic Thought to Bastiat.19
A number of authors have applied Bastiat’s theories and approaches to
modern economic problems. Henry Hazlitt, an American economic
journalist, used Bastiat’s approach to examine a number of economic
theories and policies in his classic Economics in One Lesson.20 Dean
Russell, an economist, also applied Bastiat’s theories and approaches to a
wide range of economic issues.21

Frédéric Bastiat, L’État, reprinted in ŒUVRES COMPLÈTES DE FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT, TOME
QUATRIÈME 327–41 (3d ed. 1873) and THE BASTIAT COLLECTION, supra note 3, VOL. I, at 95–
107; Frédéric Bastiat, Harmonies Économiques, reprinted in ŒUVRES COMPLÈTES DE FRÉDÉRIC
BASTIAT, TOME SIXIÈME (6th ed. 1870), available at http://files.libertyfund.org/files/948/013706_Bk_Sm.pdf; Frédéric Bastiat, Le Libre-Échange, reprinted in ŒUVRES COMPLÈTES DE
FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT, TOME DEUXIÈME (2d ed. 1862) [hereinafter Bastiat, Le Libre-Échange],
available at http://files.libertyfund.org/files/944/0137-02_Bk_Sm.pdf; Bastiat, Petition, in
BASTIAT, ECONOMIC SOPHISMS, supra note 10; BASTIAT, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 3;
Frédéric Bastiat, Sophismes Économiques, Petits Pamphlets I, reprinted in ŒUVRES COMPLÈTES
DE
FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT, TOME QUATRIÈME
(3d
ed.
1873),
available
at
http://files.libertyfund.org/files/946/0137-04_Bk_Sm.pdf;
Frédéric
Bastiat,
Sophismes
Économiques, Petits Pamphletes II, reprinted in ŒUVRE COMPLÈTES DE FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT,
TOME CINQUIÈME (3d ed. 1873), available at http://files.libertyfund.org/files/947/013705_Bk_SM.pdf; Bastiat, What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen in BASTIAT, SELECTED ESSAYS,
supra note 4.
12. Bastiat, Cobden et la Ligue, supra note 11.
13. MARK BLAUG, GREAT ECONOMISTS BEFORE KEYNES (1986).
14. ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS (7th ed. 1999).
15. MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, CLASSICAL ECONOMICS: AN AUSTRIAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE
HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT, VOL. II, at 444–53 (1995).
16. Id. at 445. Bastiat was able to refute the Keynesian multiplier theory 100 years (actually
about 86 years) before Keynes advanced it because the theory did not originate with Keynes. The
concept had been prevalent in France in the 1840s, when Bastiat did his writing.
17. MARK SKOUSEN, THE MAKING OF MODERN ECONOMICS: THE LIVES AND IDEAS OF THE
GREAT THINKERS 59–65 (2d ed. 2009).
18. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 400 (1954).
19. LEWIS H. HANEY, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT (4th ed. 1949).
20. HAZLITT, supra note 5.
21. DEAN RUSSELL, GOVERNMENT AND LEGAL PLUNDER: BASTIAT BROUGHT UP TO DATE
(1985).
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One defining characteristic of Bastiat was his wit. He deployed the
reductio ad absurdum technique to highlight the illogic in his opponents’
arguments. Nowhere is this approach better illustrated than in his
Candlemakers’ Petition,22 to which we turn next.
I. THE CANDLEMAKERS’ PETITION
The Candlemakers’ Petition, also referred to as The Petition of the
Candlemakers in some reprints and originally titled Pétition des Fabricants
de Chandelles, Bougies, Lampes, Chandeliers, Réverbères, Mouchettes,
Éteignoirs, et des Producteurs de Suif, Huile, Résine, Alcool, et
Généralement de Tout Ce Qui Concerne L’Éclairage23 [Petition of the
Manufacturers of Candles, Waxlights, Lamps, Candlesticks, Street Lamps,
Snuffers, Extinguishers, and of the Producers of Tallow, Oil, Resin,
Alcohol, and Generally Everything Connected with Lighting],24 has become
a classic of the free trade literature. It has been reprinted many times in
economics textbooks and in other trade publications.25
The Petition was instigated in response to the French Chamber of
Deputies, which passed legislation that increased duties on all foreign
products; a measure they thought would benefit French industry.26 It begins
as follows:
You are on the right track. You reject abstract theories and have little
regard for abundance and low prices. You concern yourselves mainly with
the fate of the producer. You wish to free him from foreign competition,
that is, to reserve the domestic market for domestic industry.
We come to offer you a wonderful opportunity for applying your—
what shall we call it? Your theory? No, nothing is more deceptive than
theory. Your doctrine? Your system? Your principle? But you dislike
doctrines, you have a horror of systems, and, as for principles, you deny
that there are any in political economy; therefore we shall call it your
practice—your practice without theory and without principle.27

The Petition goes on to complain about the suffering French producers
are incurring as a result of a foreign competitor “who . . . works under
conditions [that are] so far superior to” those of the French manufacturers
that they are unable to compete.28 This competitor is flooding the French
market with light at such an “incredibly low price” that French producers of
light such as candle makers, makers of lanterns, street lamps, and the

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Bastiat, Petition, in BASTIAT, ECONOMIC SOPHISMS, supra note 10.
Id. at 10.
THE BASTIAT COLLECTION, supra note 10, VOL. I, at 227.
See, e.g., HEILBRONER, supra note 14.
Id. at 179–80.
Bastiat, Petition in BASTIAT, ECONOMIC SOPHISMS, supra note 3, at 56.
Id.
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secondary industries that support those industries—such as the producers of
oil, tallow, resin, alcohol and extinguishers—are threatened with stagnation
if not total destruction.29
This foreign competitor, of course, is the sun. Bastiat’s Petition asks the
French legislature to pass a law requiring everyone to close their windows,
sky lights, dormers, inside and outside shutters, curtains and anything else
that allows light to enter.30
He goes on to explain the benefits of passing such a law. Shutting off as
much natural light as possible creates a need for artificial light, which
would encourage a wide range of French industry.31 In order to consume
more tallow it would be necessary to have more cattle and sheep, which
would require more cleared fields, leather, wool, meat and manure, which is
the basis of all French agricultural wealth.32
But that is not the end of the story. If the French consume more oil it
would be necessary to expand cultivation of several agricultural products,
including the olive, rapeseed and the poppy.33 The fact that these plants
exhaust the soil would not be a problem because the increased breeding of
cattle would result in the production of more manure to fertilize the fields
where these items are being grown.34
French moors would be “covered with resinous trees.”35 French
mountains would be swarming with bees.36 All sectors of agriculture would
vastly expand.
The shipping industry would also expand.37 Thousands of French
vessels would be employed by the whaling industry, to the glory of France.
The Parisian manufacturing sector would also prosper. One would soon see
gilding, bronze and crystal in lamps, candle sticks, chandeliers and
candelabra. There will not be a resin collector or miner who will not enjoy
increased wages and prosperity. There is not one Frenchman, from the
wealthy stockbroker to the humblest match vendor whose condition would
not be improved by outlawing the sun.
Bastiat goes on to address the objections that the French Chamber of
Deputies might raise and responds to them. One might object that, although
French industry may benefit from protectionism, France itself will not
benefit because consumers will have to pay. Bastiat answers:

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id. at 57.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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You no longer have the right to invoke the interests of the consumer.
You have sacrificed him whenever you have found his interests opposed
to those of the producer. You have done so in order to encourage industry
and to increase employment. For the same reason you ought to do so this
time too.38

Bastiat points out that when the argument was made that consumers
have a stake in the free importation of iron, coal, sesame, wheat and
textiles, the Chamber of Deputies responded that French producers have a
stake in their exclusion. Likewise, if they raise the objection that French
consumers have a stake in the admission of natural light, producers have a
stake in preventing consumers from obtaining it for free.
Free traders might also assert that the producer and the consumer are
the same person. If manufacturers benefit from the protection, they will
cause farmers to also benefit. The protection will open markets for
manufactured goods. If the Chamber of Deputies would grant a daytime
monopoly over the production of light, “large amounts of tallow, charcoal,
resin, wax, alcohol, silver, iron, bronze, and crystal,”39 would be purchased,
making those industries rich. They will consume the products of all other
French industries, causing a ripple effect throughout the French economy.
He then raises another free market argument. “[S]un[light] is a
gratuitous gift of [n]ature.”40 Rejecting such a gift “would be to reject
wealth itself under the pretext of encouraging [production].”41 He then
points out that if the Chamber of Deputies takes that position they “strike a
mortal blow at [their] own policy.”42 On previous occasions the French
Chamber of Deputies argued in favor of excluding foreign goods “because
and in proportion as they approximate gratuitous gifts.”43
Labor and nature combine to produce various commodities.44 The
relative proportion of labor and nature depend on the country and the
climate. The portion provided by nature is free. It is only the labor
component that we must pay for. “Thus, when an orange [arrives] . . . from
Portugal, [it can be said that it is given to the French nation] half free of
charge, or . . . at half price . . . compared [to oranges] from Paris.”45
It is precisely on the basis that the product is half free that protectionists
argue it should be barred. That being the case, how can it be argued that a
totally free product should be admitted into competition? Such an argument
involves inconsistency. If something that is half free is harmful to French

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 58.
Id. at 59.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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domestic industry, one must exclude something that is totally free with
twice the zeal.
Bastiat then gives another example. When a product such as iron, coal,
wheat or textiles comes from abroad, enabling French consumers to obtain
it for less labor than if it were produced domestically, the difference is a
gratuitous gift. The size of the gift is in direct proportion to the difference in
cost. The gift is as complete as it can be when the donor – the sun –
provides us with light and asks for nothing in return.
The question Bastiat then poses is whether what they desire for France
is the benefit to be gained by this free consumption or the alleged
advantages of onerous production. He instructs them to make their choice
but to be logical. Since they ban foreign iron, coal, wheat and textiles in
proportion as their price approaches zero, it would be utterly inconsistent to
admit sunlight, which has a price of zero all day long.
The point Bastiat was trying to make is that the arguments the Chamber
of Deputies had used in the past to justify protection for other commodities
were absurd when taken to their logical conclusions. Outlawing the sun, to
the extent possible, would be a stupid and irrational policy, since the sun
costs nothing and all of France benefits. What is less obvious is that foreign
products that cost less than French products constitute partial gifts to the
French people.
Bastiat uses another approach in his essay, What Is Seen and What Is
Not Seen,46 to make the same point. He argues that what is seen by
protecting a wide range of French industry from competition by the sun is
an increase in sales for candle makers and other industries that are involved
in the artificial light industry, but what is not seen is all the business that
never takes place in other industries because French consumers now have to
pay for something that was formerly free. If consumers must pay more for
light products, they will have less to spend on every other industry and
service. All the non-light industries and service providers will suffer as a
result of protecting the French artificial lighting industry.
As was mentioned, Bastiat was a vigorous advocate of free trade. He
wanted to do for France what Cobden and Bright were doing for England,
namely, abolishing restrictions to trade.47 Two tools in his toolbox were
ridicule and reductio ad absurdum. He also employed logic, utilitarian
analysis, and, at times, rights theory to make his point. We now turn to
some of his other writings on free trade.

46. Bastiat, What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen in BASTIAT, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 4.
47. Bastiat, Le Libre-Échange, supra note 11.
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II. DIFFERENTIAL TARIFFS
In a short essay on differential tariffs, Bastiat illustrates the effect such
tariffs have on the common man.48 In the example, an impoverished French
farmer who lovingly tended his vines finally raises enough grapes to make a
cask of wine, which he takes to the nearest town, telling his wife that he
will use the proceeds from the sale to purchase enough material for her “‘to
furnish a trousseau for our daughter.’”49
When he arrives he meets a Belgian and an Englishman. The Belgian
offers to give him fifteen parcels of yarn for his wine. The Englishman
offers him twenty parcels, explaining that the reason he can offer more is
because the English spin at lower cost than the Belgians.50
Before he can make the trade, a customs officer who was there said:
“‘My good man, trade with the Belgian, if you wish, but my orders are to
keep you from trading with the Englishman.’”51
“‘What?’” the farmer exclaimed. “‘You want me to be content with
fifteen parcels of yarn from Brussels, when I could have twenty from
Manchester?’”52
The customs official replied, “‘Certainly; do you not see that France
would lose if you received twenty parcels instead of fifteen?’”53
The farmer found that result difficult to understand. The customs
official replied that he found it difficult to explain, stating only that “‘it is a
fact; for all our deputies, cabinet ministers, and journalists agree that the
more a nation receives in exchange for a given quantity of its products, the
poorer it becomes.’”54
Because of this policy the farmer had to be content dealing with the
Belgian. As a result, his daughter got only three-fourths of a trousseau and
the farmer’s family is still trying to figure out how a person can be ruined
by receiving four parcels of yarn instead of three, and why a person is richer
with three dozen towels than with four dozen.
Bastiat’s example makes obvious what politicians and some economists
try to obscure: that consumers are better off if they are not prevented from
trading with whomever they want. Protectionists would argue that tariffs or
outright bans on imports are necessary to protect French industry. But in
this case there was no Frenchman present other than the farmer. There were
two losers in this exchange, the Frenchman and the Englishman, and only
48. Frédéric Bastiat, Droits Différentiels, reprinted in ŒUVRES COMPLÈTES DE FRÉDÉRIC
BASTIAT,
TOME
QUATRIÈME
63–66
(3d
ed.
1873),
available
at
http://files.libertyfund.org/files/946/0137-04_Bk_Sm.pdf, and BASTIAT, ECONOMIC SOPHISMS,
supra note 3, at 61–62 [hereinafter Bastiat, Differential Tariffs in ECONOMIC SOPHISMS].
49. Id. at 61.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 62.
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one winner, the Belgian. Since the losers exceed the winners, the result is
what economists would call a negative-sum game. Utilitarians would call it
an unethical policy, since utilitarian ethics treats positive-sum games as
ethical and negative-sum games as unethical.55 Rights theorists would
consider the policy of imposing tariffs unethical because it violates contract
and property rights.56
One might counter that the transaction is positive-sum, since all trade is
a positive-sum game. Both parties are better off after than before the trade.
Otherwise they would not have entered into the trade. That is perfectly true.
Both the farmer and the Belgian are better off as a result of the trade. But
the farmer is not as well off as he would have been in the absence of the
legal restriction.
Which argument wins depends on how you define negative-sum game,
and this is one of the problems with economic analysis. The definition
sometimes determines the conclusion. Under Bastiat’s definition, the
Englishman was a loser, although he was not a party to the transaction. He
would have been a winner if the transaction had been allowed to take place.
III. UTILITARIAN AND RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES
Regardless of how one might consider the outcome of the French
farmer and Belgian merchant example from a utilitarian perspective, the
outcome from a rights perspective is clear. Someone’s rights have been
violated; therefore, the policy is unethical.
The utilitarian and rights perspectives might be summarized by the
following two flowcharts:

55. One of the basic premises of utilitarian ethics is that an act is ethical if the good exceeds
the bad or if winners exceed losers, which is not quite the same thing. Utilitarian ethics is
discussed below.
56. See Robert W. McGee, Ethical Aspects of Using Government to Subvert Competition:
Antidumping Laws as a Case Study of Rent Seeking Activity. 83 J. BUS. ETHICS 759–71 (2008).
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According to utilitarian ethics, an act or policy is ethical if the result is
more winners than losers, or if the result is a positive-sum game, which is
not quite the same thing. Early utilitarians57 stated that an act or policy is
good if the result is the greatest good for the greatest number, a condition
that is impossible to achieve, since it is not possible to maximize two
variables at the same time.58
With respect to Bastiat’s French farmer, one might conclude that the
transaction meets the utilitarian ethics test because both parties to the
transaction—the French farmer and the Belgian merchant—are better off as
a result of the trade. While it may be argued that the Englishman has lost as
a result of the trade, he is, in fact, in exactly the same position as he was
before the trade. Before the transaction, he had twenty parcels and after it
he has the same twenty parcels, although his rights have been violated by
being prevented from entering into the trade.
But the French farmer is not as well off as he would have been if he had
been allowed to trade with the Englishman instead of the Belgian.
Utilitarian ethics has a problem dealing with this kind of fact situation, but
it is not a totally insurmountable one. A more sophisticated approach would
be to take the position that “an action is right if and only if it brings about at
least as much net happiness as any other action the agent could have
performed; otherwise it is wrong.”59 In other words, even if the outcome is
positive, it is unethical unless it is the most positive of all possible
outcomes.
Under this more holistic utilitarian perspective, the fact that the trade
restriction leads to a suboptimal result makes it wrong. Bastiat’s example
illustrates this point without coming right out and saying it.
The second flowchart illustrates the rights position. According to this
view an act or policy is inherently unethical or unjust if someone’s rights
are violated by it, even if the winners’ gains exceed the losers’ losses. For
example, if two wolves and one sheep were to take a vote on what to have
for lunch, a utilitarian would conclude that voting to eat the sheep was an
ethical act because the winners exceeded the losers, whereas a rights
theorist would conclude the act was unethical because the rights of the
sheep were violated. The fact that some majority benefited is totally
irrelevant.
One of the inherent flaws in utilitarian ethics is that it ignores rights.
Bentham, one of the early utilitarians, would disagree, since he believes that
57. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds. 1982); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM
(Roger Crisp ed., 1998).
58. JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR 11 (60th Anniversary ed. 2004); G. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162
SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
59. WILLIAM H. SHAW, CONTEMPORARY ETHICS: TAKING ACCOUNT OF UTILITARIANISM 10
(1999).
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there is no such thing as inherent rights,60 but we will leave discussion of
this issue for another day.
Bastiat addressed trade issues from a predominantly utilitarian point of
view. His arguments are utilitarian in the sense that he consistently argues
that free trade results in more winners than losers and that society benefits
from free trade. But his philosophical outlook was not limited to utility. He
was also, at times, a rights theorist. The most complete exposition of his
rights position was laid out in The Law.61 In it, Bastiat describes how the
law can be perverted into a tool of legal plunder. “Under the pretense of
organization, regulation, protection, or encouragement,” Bastiat writes, “the
law takes property from one person and gives it to another; the law takes
the wealth of all and gives it to a few—whether farmers, manufacturers,
shipowners, artists, or comedians.”62
Some economists call this practice rent-seeking, or using the law to
feather the nests of the few (special interests) at the expense of the many.63
But how is this legal plunder to be identified? Quite simply. See if the
law takes from some persons what belongs to them, and gives it to other
persons to whom it does not belong. See if the law benefits one citizen at
the expense of another by doing what the citizen himself cannot do
without committing a crime.
Then abolish this law without delay, for it is not only an evil itself,
but also it is a fertile source for further evils because it invites reprisals. If
such a law—which may be an isolated case—is not abolished
immediately, it will spread, multiply, and develop into a system.64

Bastiat applied this view in the following trade example.

60. BENTHAM, supra note 57; NONSENSE UPON STILTS: BENTHAM, BURKE AND MARX ON THE
RIGHTS OF MAN (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1987) [hereinafter WALDRON]. “That which has no
existence cannot be destroyed—that which cannot be destroyed cannot require anything to
preserve it from destruction. Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights,
rhetorical nonsense,—nonsense upon stilts.” Id. at 53 (quoting Bentham’s famous quote is from
ANARCHICAL FALLACIES (1843)). In other words, all rights come from government. Bastiat
would disagree. In THE LAW, Bastiat takes the position that rights come before government.
BASTIAT, THE LAW, supra note 3. Governments are formed to protect life, liberty and property.
Id. Governments that limit themselves to these functions are just. Id. Governments that go beyond
these functions are unjust because they use the force of government to redistribute wealth. Id.
61. BASTIAT, THE LAW, supra note 3.
62. Id. at 13. Bastiat also discusses plunder in Plunder and Law, reprinted in BASTIAT,
SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 3, at 229–39, and The Physiology of Plunder, reprinted in
BASTIAT, ECONOMIC SOPHISMS, supra note 3, at 129–46.
63. For discussions of the concept of rent seeking, see 40 YEARS OF RESEARCH ON RENT
SEEKING 2 (Roger D. Congleton, Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad eds., 2008); EFFICIENT RENTSEEKING: CHRONICLE OF AN INTELLECTUAL QUAGMIRE (Alan Lockard & Gordon Tullock eds.,
2001); THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RENT-SEEKING (Charles K. Rowley, Robert Tollison &
Gordon Tullock, eds., 1988); GORDON TULLOCK, THE ECONOMICS OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGE AND
RENT SEEKING (1989).
64. BASTIAT, THE LAW, supra note 3, at 17.
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IV. RESTRAINT OF TRADE
In his essay, What is Seen and What Is Not Seen,65 Bastiat discusses the
case of an industrialist—whom he calls Mr. Protectionist—who “devote[s]
his time and . . . capital to converting ore from his [property] into iron.”66
However, because nature has blessed Belgium with more natural ore than
France, the Belgians are able to sell their iron for a lower price.67 This gift
from nature meant that Frenchmen in various industries such as
“nailmakers, metalworkers, cartwrights, mechanics, blacksmiths, and
plowmen” are prompted by their self-interest to buy their iron from
Flanders rather than from domestic suppliers like Mr. Protectionist.68
“His first [thought] was to stop this abuse . . . with his own two
hands.”69 He would take his carbine, four pistols, cartridges, and a sword to
the border and kill the first French tradesman he sees who attempts to buy
this cheap Belgian iron.70 It would teach them a lesson. How dare they put
their own self-interest above that of Mr. Protectionist?
But as he began to leave he started having second thoughts.71 Perhaps
some of his countrymen might not allow themselves to be killed.72 They
might kill him instead.73 Even if he took all his servants with him, they
would not be able to guard the entire border.74 Furthermore, the cost of
trying to stop this trade would cost more than his entire net worth.75
Just as he was becoming resigned to the fact that he must settle for
being free like everyone else “he had a brilliant idea.”76 “He remembered
that there is a great law factory in Paris” that made laws everyone must
conform to “whether . . . good or bad.”77 Police are paid to enforce these
laws out of the national wealth.78 Perhaps he could get this Parisian factory
to make “a nice . . . law [stating that] ‘Belgian iron is prohibited.’”79 Rather
than incurring the cost of sending his few servants to the border, the State
could send 20,000 sons of those tradesmen who were buying Belgian iron
to act as customs officials, to be paid with the taxes extracted from those

65. Bastiat, What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen in BASTIAT, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 4,
at 25–30.
66. Id. at 25.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 25–26.
71. Id. at 26.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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very same tradesmen.80 It would cost Mr. Protectionist nothing; he would
be protected from the brutality that might be inflicted on him if he were to
try to do the job himself; and it would enable him to sell the iron at his
price.81 He would also have “the sweet pleasure of seeing . . . [the] people
shamefully hoaxed.”82
So he went to members of the legislature and
presented to their excellencies the following argument: “Belgian iron is
sold in France at ten francs, which forces me to sell mine at the same
price. I should prefer to sell it at fifteen and cannot because of this
confounded Belgian iron. Manufacture a law that says: ‘Belgian iron shall
no longer enter France.’ Immediately I shall raise my price by five francs,
with the following consequences:
“. . . I shall enrich myself more quickly; I shall employ more men. . . . My
employees and I will spend more, to the great advantage of our suppliers
for miles around. These suppliers, having a greater market, will give more
orders to industry, and gradually this activity will spread throughout the
country. This lucky hundred-sou piece that you will drop into my coffers,
like a stone that is thrown into a lake will cause an infinite number of
concentric circles to radiate great distances in every direction.”83

His argument was an early example of the Keynesian multiplier, of
course.84 Some funds injected into one part of the economy will have a
ripple effect throughout all parts of the economy, having a multiplier effect.
The legislators, seeing “that it is so easy to increase the wealth of a
people simply by legislation,” decided to pass the law.85 After all, why
bother to work and save when you can easily create wealth by legislative
fiat?86
In fact, the law did everything Mr. Protectionist said it would do.
Unfortunately, it had other effects as well. What is seen is the prosperity of
Mr. Protectionist and the people who work for him. What is not seen are the
negative secondary effects that offset the gains of Mr. Protectionist and his
workers.
The scenario Mr. Protectionist presented to the members of the
legislature was incomplete. There are more people affected than merely
himself and his workers. While it is true that the extra five francs are
channeled into the pockets of Mr. Protectionist, which benefits himself and
his workers, the extra five francs “did not come down from the moon; [it
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 26–27.
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
Bastiat, What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen in BASTIAT, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 4,

at 27.

86. Id.
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came] from the pocket of a metalworker, a nailmaker, a cartwright, a
blacksmith, a plowman,”87 and other individuals who use iron in their
businesses. Mr. Protectionist’s profit is “counterbalanced” by the losses of
these other groups.88 Any encouragement of industry that Mr. Protectionist
could have done by spending his five extra francs could have equally been
done by those metalworkers and nailmakers. “The stone is thrown in at one
point in the lake only because it has been prohibited by law from being
thrown in at another.”89
“[W]hat is not seen [offsets] what is seen . . . .”90 The result “is an
injustice [that is made worse by the fact that it was] perpetrated by the
law.”91 But that is not the end of the story. There is a third person, lurking
“in the shadow[s]” who cannot be seen who has also lost five francs.92 So
there are two losers, not merely one.
These tradesmen who now have to pay fifteen francs for their iron have
five francs less to spend on other things. Before the law was passed, they
could buy the iron they needed and still have five francs left to buy other
things.93 After the law is passed they have only enough to buy the iron.94
They cannot use it to buy some other manufacture, or perhaps a book.95
There is another moral to the story aside from the fact that
protectionism results in a negative-sum game, or what Bastiat calls a “dead
loss.”96 It is the lesson Bastiat teaches in The Law. “There are people who
think that plunder loses all its immorality as soon as it becomes legal.”97
But it does not. Mr. Protectionist has used the law to do what he could not
do without committing a crime. He cannot stop Belgian iron sellers at the
border with guns and he cannot prevent his fellow Frenchmen from buying
Belgian iron by using force without committing a crime. But he can use the
law to do it for him. Thus, for Bastiat, the law is “perverted.”98
V. ANTIDUMPING—A MODERN EXAMPLE
Protectionism involves both winners and losers. The winners are
domestic producers, who stand to gain because foreign producers are
prevented from selling their products on domestic markets at a price they
would otherwise charge. Tariffs on the importation of foreign products raise
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 28.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 28–29.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 29.
See id.
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the price of those products, making them less competitive and making it
easier for domestic producers to keep their prices at a higher level than
would be possible in a free market, where foreign producers are able to
compete on price. But there are also losers. The losers consist of just about
everyone else, since protectionism causes prices to rise above the market
price and causes some products to be totally unavailable, which forces
consumers to be content with their second or third choice rather than their
first choice.
While one might argue that tariff rates have come down since 1999—
which is partly true—not all tariff rates have come down. As tariffs have
been reduced, domestic producers have shifted their attention to
antidumping law—a different kind of protectionist tariff—which they have
found to be a very effective tool to thwart foreign competition.99
Antidumping laws100 serve the same purpose today as they did in
Bastiat’s time. Such laws have been in existence in the U.S. since World
War I, if not earlier. They punish foreign producers for selling their
products on domestic markets for less than the cost of production or for a
lower price than what they charge in their home markets. You might ask,
“Why would anyone care?” After all, low prices are good for consumers,
and in the case of steel and chemicals and other products that domestic
producers purchase to turn into finished products—like automobiles—
99. For more on this point, see ANTIDUMPING: HOW IT WORKS AND WHO GETS HURT (J.
Michael Finger, ed., 1993); JAMES BOVARD, THE FAIR TRADE FRAUD 107–68 (1991); GARY
CLYDE HUFBAUER, DIANE T. BERLINER & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, TRADE PROTECTION IN THE
UNITED STATES: 31 CASE STUDIES (1986); BRINK LINDSEY & DANIEL J. IKENSON,
ANTIDUMPING EXPOSED: THE DEVILISH DETAILS ON UNFAIR TRADE LAW (2003); Wesley K.
Caine, A Case for Repealing the Antidumping Provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930, 13 LAW &
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 681 (1981); Ronald A. Cass & Stephen J. Narkin, Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Law: The United States and the GATT, in DOWN IN THE DUMPS:
ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNFAIR TRADE LAWS 200–52 (Richard Boltuck & Robert E. Litan eds.,
1991); Seema P. Chandnani, European Community Antidumping Regulation: Law and Practice,
13 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 391 (1990); Stuart A. Christie, Anti-Dumping Policy of the
European Community and the Growing Spectre of Protectionism in Technology-Related Goods,
16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 475 (1990); Gilbert B. Kaplan, Lynn G. Kamarck & Marie
Parker, Cost Analysis Under the Antidumping Law, 21 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 357
(1988); Michael S. Knoll, United States Antidumping Law: The Case for Reconsideration, 22 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 265 (1987).
100. The Revenue Act of 1916—also referred to as the Antidumping Duty Act of 1916—was
perhaps the first major piece of antidumping legislation. Revenue Act of 1916, 15 U.S.C. § 72,
repealed by Pub. L. No. 108-429, § 2006(a), 118 Stat. 2597 (2004). It was passed in response to
alleged predatory dumping by Germany during World War I. The law made it a crime to import
foreign goods for less than the wholesale or actual market value. Since it was a criminal law,
which had an intent requirement, it was difficult to obtain convictions. Thus, there was a
(perceived) need for a civil statute that would lower the barrier to conviction. Knoll points out that
there was only one (unsuccessful) prosecution under this act in the first 50 years of its existence.
See Knoll, supra note 99, at 268 n. 22. The Antidumping Act of 1921 was a response to these
difficulties. It established the rules and procedures used today to determine liability and penalties.
The Antidumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. §§ 160–171, repealed by Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 106(a),
93 Stat. 193 (1979).
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allowing such a practice also benefits domestic producers. Lower steel
prices for auto makers means lower costs for automakers, which translates
into lower consumer prices for cars and higher profits for domestic auto
manufacturers. Lower costs of production also make domestic auto makers
more competitive in international markets.
Antidumping laws, protect special interests101 at the expense of the vast
majority. They actually obstruct trade rather than foster it.102 There may be
legitimate and rational reasons for dumping a product on the market. For
example, it makes sense for a flower monger to sell wilted flowers for
whatever price they can get, since the alternative is not selling them at all.103
Furthermore, the microeconomic theory of discriminatory pricing actually
justifies the practice of selling the same product for different prices in
different markets as a way to increase sales and profits.104 This is the reason
movie theaters give senior citizen discounts and restaurants give discounts
to people who arrive for dinner before the normal rush hour. It is a perfectly
acceptable practice when movie theaters and restaurants engage in
discriminatory pricing but illegal when foreign producers do it.105
101. Domestic producers can be labeled as a special interest group, since they represent only a
small percentage of the total population. There are only a few hundred or a few thousand orange
juice producers in the United States, mostly located in either Florida or California, compared to
more than 300 million potential consumers of orange juice in the United States. There are only a
few auto and steel producers in the United States, compared to more than 300 million potential
customers.
102. Sungjoon Cho, Anticompetitive Trade Remedies: How Antidumping Measures Obstruct
Market Competition, 87 N.C. L. REV. 357 (2009).
103. “Commerce effectively compared the price of a fresh flower sold in Amsterdam with the
price of a wilted flower sold in New York.” BOVARD, supra note 99, at 120. Bovard examines
numerous examples of the abuse of U.S. antidumping laws. For instance, the Commerce
Department increased the dumping margins for a company that donated some unsold televisions to
charity, charging it with selling the televisions at a zero price. Id. Companies have also been
punished for selling TVs to employees at a discount and for selling damaged and faulty TVs at a
reduced price. Id. When computing the cost of production the Commerce Department has been
known to misclassify direct and indirect costs in a way that leads to a finding of dumping where it
might not have occurred. Id at 123–25. The way Commerce calculates the cost of production has
also been criticized as unfair. Id. at 126–31. For example, Matsushita withdrew a telephone from
the U.S. market after the Commerce Department demanded that it translate 3,000 pages of
Japanese financial documents into English by Monday morning. The demand had been made the
previous Friday afternoon. Id at 135–36. For a discussion of the procedural shortcomings of
antidumping law in the U.S., see N. David Palmeter, Torquemada and the Tariff Act: The
Inquisitor Rides Again, 20 INT’L L. 641 (1986).
104. For a discussion of price discrimination from a law and economics perspective, see Daniel
J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, The Law and Economics of Price Discrimination in Modern
Economies: Time for Reconciliation?, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235 (2010).
105. Antidumping laws also invite retaliation. For countries, like China, whose producers that
have been the target of numerous antidumping investigations, the government might decide (and
has decided) to retaliate by targeting any number of industries in the countries that have launched
antidumping actions against Chinese companies. For a discussion of retaliation in trade, see
Gabriel L. Slater, Note, The Suspension of Intellectual Property Obligations Under TRIPS: A
Proposal for Retaliating Against Technology-Exporting Countries in the World Trade
Organization, 97 GEO. L.J. 1365 (2009).
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No one’s rights are violated by dumping. From a utilitarian perspective,
voluntary trade is an ethical act because there are two winners and no
losers. Trade is not a zero-sum game where one party’s gain is exactly
offset by another party’s loss.106
A number of studies have attempted to estimate the cost of various
protectionist measures such as antidumping laws. Messerlin107 did a
massive study of the cost of protectionism in Europe. He computed the
costs of tariffs and other nontariff barriers in a wide range of industries for
1990, 1995, and 1999, and stated that the 1999 levels would likely not
change until at least 2005.108 For 1999 the overall rate of protection for all
industries included in the study was 11.7 percent.109 The average tariff rate
was 7.0 percent and antidumping charges, which act like tariffs, averaged
22.4 percent,110 making many target companies uncompetitive, since very
few companies in competitive industries can afford to raise their prices by
22.4 percent and still compete against domestic producers.
Messerlin’s study also demonstrated that the cost of antidumping laws
varies by industry. Some industries are targeted more than others. Overall,
antidumping rates averaged 17.5 percent in 1990, 21.8 percent in 1995 and
22.4 percent in 1999,111 but the rates for some industries were much higher
than the average. For leather and leather products the 1999 rate was 27.9
percent; for petroleum and coal products it was 30.0 percent; for radio, TV
and communication it was 37.7 percent.112 Fifteen of the twenty-two sectors
in the Messerlin study had an overall protection rate of more than 30
percent; 19 of the sectors had an overall protection rate of over 15
percent.113 Foreign producers find it very difficult to make a profit with
such high penalties, which makes it possible for domestic producers to raise
their prices without fear of rigorous price competition.
Studies similar to the Messerlin European study have been conducted
for China,114 Korea,115 and the United States.116 The findings in those
studies were similar to those of Messerlin. These studies all strongly
suggest that trade barriers increase costs to consumers while reducing
efficiency and welfare.
106. This point is discussed in depth in MANUEL F. AYAU, NOT A ZERO-SUM GAME: THE
PARADOX OF EXCHANGE (2007).
107. PATRICK A. MESSERLIN, MEASURING THE COSTS OF PROTECTION IN EUROPE (2001).
108. Id. at 21.
109. Id. at 23.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 22–23.
112. Id. at 23.
113. Id. at 45.
114. ZHANG SHUGUANG, ZHANG YANSHENG & WAN ZHONGXIN, MEASURING THE COSTS OF
PROTECTION IN CHINA (1999).
115. NAMDOO KIM, MEASURING THE COSTS OF VISIBLE PROTECTION IN KOREA (1996).
116. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, MEASURING THE COSTS OF
PROTECTIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES (1994).
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Dean et al. estimated the price effects of non-tariff trade barriers for
forty-seven consumer products grouped into four categories for more than
sixty countries.117 They found that non-tariff trade barriers often caused
significant increases in consumer prices. Table 1 summarizes their findings.
Table 1: Price Rises in Consumer Products118
as a Result of Non-Tariff Trade Barriers
Product Group
Fruits & vegetables
Bovine meat
Processed food
Apparel

Range of Price
Increases (%)
2-61
2-90
34-53
8-97

Mean Increase (%)
44
54
41
50

Non-tariff trade barriers increased the price of fruits and vegetables by
an average of 44 percent, with a range of 2–61 percent. The average for
bovine meat was 54 percent, with a range of 2–90 percent. The category of
processed food had the lowest average price increase, 41 percent, although
none of the countries included in the study had price increases of less than
34 percent. Apparel prices increased by an average of 50 percent as a result
of non-tariff trade barriers, with a range of 8–97 percent. Since consumers
have to pay more for food products, they have less to spend on other things,
like autos, vacations, entertainment, education and a wide range of other
products and services.
The conclusion is that using protectionist measures to save jobs or
protect domestic industry results in an inefficient allocation of resources. It
would be far cheaper simply to pay people three or six months worth of
salary and let them find a new job.119
An argument penned by Bastiat in his Candlemakers’ Petition,120
discussed above, may be one of the best arguments against antidumping
measures. The gist of his argument is that it is in the best interest of those
on the receiving end of this gift of low prices to accept this gift. Doing so
would free up assets that would otherwise be used to purchase the product

117. Judith M. Dean, et. al., Estimating the Price Effects of Non-Tariff Barriers, 9 B.E. J. ECON.
ANALYSIS & POL’Y, art. 12, 1 (2009), available at http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/vol9/
iss1/art12.
118. Id. at 25.
119. Forcing taxpayers to pay people not to work is ethically questionable. Rights theorists
would conclude that paying people not to work is inherently unethical because it takes property
from the rightful owners and gives it to those who have done nothing to earn it. See BASTIAT, THE
LAW, supra note 3, at 17; BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL, THE ETHICS OF REDISTRIBUTION (1952).
Bastiat would have considered forcing taxpayers to pay people who do not work to be a form of
legalized plunder. See BASTIAT, THE LAW, supra note 3, at 6–9, 13–19.
120. Bastiat, Petition in BASTIAT, ECONOMIC SOPHISMS, supra note 10.
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(illumination, in Bastiat’s example) to purchase other things, thus
increasing the standard of living for the vast majority.
His argument was utilitarian, of course, since the underlying premise is
that the vast majority benefit,121 what modern economists call a positivesum game. But the real issue is one of rights. Do individuals have the right
to exchange what they have for what they want or don’t they, and if not,
why not? One cannot use a public policy argument to justify preventing free
trade, since free trade benefits the vast majority,122 albeit at the expense of
the special interests.
Bastiat discussed this perversion of definitions. Those who would
justify protectionism on the basis of promoting the general welfare would
include plunder in the definition of the general welfare, which is in conflict
with the definition of justice.123 For Bastiat, justice exists when the
government confines itself to the protection of life, liberty and property.
When it goes beyond these basic functions it engages in redistribution. It
takes property from those who are entitled to it and gives it to those who are
not entitled to it. The result is injustice.124

121. It is a valid premise. One study estimated that Americans are $1 trillion better off each
year as a result of international trade. See I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 311, n.1
(4th ed., 2005) (citing Scott C. Bradford, Paul L.E. Grieco & Gary Clyde Hufbauer, The Payoff to
America from Global Integration, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD ECONOMY (C. Fred
Bergsten ed., 2005)).
122. For discussions of free trade from the perspective of utilitarianism, see JAGDISH
BHAGWATI, FREE TRADE TODAY (2002); JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION
(2004); JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM (1988); TYLER COWEN, CREATIVE DESTRUCTION:
HOW GLOBALIZATION IS CHANGING THE WORLD’S CULTURES (2002); DANIEL GRISWOLD, MAD
ABOUT TRADE: WHY MAIN STREET AMERICA SHOULD EMBRACE GLOBALIZATION (2009);
DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, FREE TRADE UNDER FIRE (3d ed. 2009); TOMAS LARSSON, THE RACE TO
THE TOP: THE REAL STORY OF GLOBALIZATION (2001); JOHAN NORBERG, IN DEFENSE OF
GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2003); MARTIN WOLF, WHY GLOBALIZATION WORKS (2004).
123. Bastiat discusses these points in Conflict of Principles, in BASTIAT, ECONOMIC SOPHISMS,
supra note 3, at 86–89.
124. BASTIAT, THE LAW, supra note 3, at 12–15, 20–21.

